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Via Federal eRulemaking Portal

Chair Charlotte A. Burrows  
Vice Chair Jocelyn Samuels  
Commissioner Keith E. Sonderling  
Commissioner Andrea R. Lucas  
Commissioner Kalpana Kotagal  
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
131 M Street NE  
Washington, DC 20507

Re: EPPC Scholar Comment on EEOC PROPOSED Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace, Docket ID EEOC–2023–0005, RIN 3046–ZA02

Dear Chair Burrows, Vice Chair Samuels, and Commissioners Sonderling, Lucas, and Kotagal:

I write in response to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s proposed “Enforcement Guidance on Harassment in the Workplace” (“guidance” or “harassment guidance”).1 I am a scholar at the Ethics and Public Policy Center (EPPC), where I direct EPPC’s HHS Accountability Project, and I am a former attorney at the EEOC.

I support the EEOC’s efforts to prevent and remedy unlawful harassment in the workplace. EEOC’s proposed harassment guidance, however, exceeds the Commission’s authority by covering actions and speech not prohibited by law, raising serious religious freedom and free speech concerns.

While EEOC is clear that its guidance does “not have the force and effect of law” and is “not meant to bind the public in any way,”2 it is important that EEOC guidance accurately reflects the law. As EEOC well knows, considerable weight is placed on EEOC guidance. Indeed, EEOC intends its guidance to “provide clarity to the public,” and “serve[] as a resource” for EEOC staff, other federal agencies, employers, employees, practitioners, and courts considering harassment issues.3 Yet its proposed guidance does the opposite of “provide clarity” by overstating the law and ignoring constitutional and statutory free speech and religious exercise protections for employees and employers.

As former EEOC general counsel Sharon Fast Gustafson and I recently wrote:

The EEOC would do well to remember that it is an arm of the federal government, responsible for serving all the people, not a partisan or public-interest advocacy organization like the ACLU. The EEOC has a duty of good government and not just

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1 Available at https://www.eeoc.gov/proposed-enforcement-guidance-harassment-workplace [hereinafter “EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance”].
2 Id. at 5.
3 Id. at 4-5.
aggressive litigation. And it has a duty to uphold the Constitution, including [protections for religious exercise], and to enforce the law as written by Congress in an evenhanded way.⁴

As shown below, EEOC makes several claims in the proposed guidance that do not accurately reflect the law. The guidance fails to acknowledge relevant laws protecting employees’ and employers’ free speech and religious exercise. In its final guidance, I urge the Commission to not overstate or misstate the law, acknowledge areas where courts have disagreed with the Commission’s position, and explicitly acknowledge legal protections for free speech and religious exercise in the workplace.

I. EEOC harassment guidance should apply to “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions,” not broader “reproductive decisions.”

Following the EEOC’s controversial and unlawful proposal to mandate abortion accommodations under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA),⁵ the draft harassment guidance states sex-based harassment also includes harassment based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, including lactation,” and can include “harassment based on a woman’s reproductive decisions, such as decisions about contraception or abortion.”

First off, I support the Commission’s use of the term “woman” in discussing harassment protections related to pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast, in the EEOC’s recently proposed PWFA regulations, the Commission went out of the way to avoid using the term “women” when discussing pregnant employees.⁶ Biologically, only women (regardless of how they identify) can get pregnant and experience childbirth. Significantly, the text of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), explicitly protects “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” and refers to “the life of the mother” when discussing insurance coverage for abortion.⁷ The EEOC is right to explicitly recognize women when discussing protections for pregnancy and childbirth harassment and should continue to do so in its final guidance.

Below I highlight ways in which the EEOC’s articulation of sex harassment related to “reproductive decisions” overstates and misstates the law. I flag where the Commission’s position, which is stated without qualification, is not supported by caselaw and where courts are not in agreement.

Lactation. The EEOC asserts that harassment based on lactation is unlawful under the PDA,⁸ citing to decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that have found that lactation is a related medical

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⁷ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). Apart from a few places, the EEOC used generic terms like “worker” and “employee” to refer to women who are pregnant. 88 Fed. Reg. 54,714, 54,715. And when it did use the term “women,” it felt the need to explain why. Footnote 22 explained, “When using language from specific sources, EEOC uses the language of that source (e.g., ‘women’ or ‘pregnant women’).” Id. at 54,716.
⁸ EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 10 n.25.
condition of pregnancy or childbirth, or both.\(^9\) However, the EEOC takes no note of other jurisdictions, including the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, that have found that breastfeeding does not fall within the scope of the PDA.\(^10\) At minimum, EEOC harassment guidance should recognize that not all courts agree with the EEOC’s position.

Reproductive Decisions. The term “reproductive decisions” is found nowhere in Title VII and is, by definition, broader than the statutory language of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” In its final guidance, EEOC should drop its extra textual language of “reproductive decisions.”

Contraception. Regarding contraception, the EEOC cites to its pregnancy guidance for the proposition that “Title VII prohibits discrimination against a woman because she uses contraceptives and citing cases.”\(^11\) But EEOC’s pregnancy guidance merely cites two district court cases and dismisses a contrary circuit court case.\(^12\) In the one circuit court case on point, *In re Union Pacific Railroad*, the Eighth Circuit held that “contraception is not ‘related to’ pregnancy for PDA purposes because, like infertility treatments, contraception is a treatment that is only indicated prior to pregnancy. Contraception is not a medical treatment that occurs when or if a woman becomes pregnant; instead, contraception prevents pregnancy from even occurring.”\(^13\) The EEOC’s pregnancy guidance claims that the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion—that “contraception is not ‘related to pregnancy’ because ‘contraception is a treatment that is only indicated prior to pregnancy’”—is “not persuasive because it is contrary to the *Johnson Controls* holding that the PDA applies to potential pregnancy.”\(^14\) But it is the EEOC’s argument that is not persuasive. The entire purpose of contraception is to prevent pregnancy. By design there is no “potential pregnancy.” In addition to the Eighth Circuit, two other district courts have likewise questioned extending the PDA to contraceptives.\(^15\) It is inappropriate for the EEOC to blanketly claim that decisions about contraception are covered when most courts disagree. At minimum, EEOC should recognize in its guidance that courts disagree with its position, including the only circuit court that has yet addressed this issue.

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\(^9\) See *Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, Ala.*, 870 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (“lactation is a related medical condition and therefore covered under the PDA”); *E.E.O.C. v. Houston Funding II, Ltd.*, 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding “lactation is a related medical condition of pregnancy for purposes of the PDA”); *Allen-Brown v. D.C.*, 174 F. Supp. 3d 463, 478 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding lactation is a medical condition related to childbirth, such that the PDA applies to lactation).


\(^13\) *In re Union Pacific Railroad*, 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007).

\(^14\) EEOC Pregnancy Guidance at § I.A.3.d n.38.

\(^15\) See, *EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc.*, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218 n.1, 1219–20. (D. Minn. 2001) (explaining that it had “serious doubts about the merits of a PDA claim in this context” (citing *Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr.*, 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that “[t]he Eighth Circuit has made clear that prevention of conception is outside the scope of the PDA”); *Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc.*, No. 02-252, 2002 WL 731815, at *2, *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002) (dismissing case for lack of standing but explaining that “[b]y no stretch of the imagination does the prohibition against discrimination based on ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition[s]’ require the provision of contraceptives as part of the treatment for infertility”).
Abortion. In support of extending harassment protections to abortion, EEOC cites its (non-legally binding) pregnancy guidance, two circuit court cases, and a district court case. But three pre-Dobbs court decisions involving employee terminations, including one by a district court, hardly create an established interpretation of harassment under Title VII nationwide. Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether Title VII protects employees from abortion discrimination and has never held that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” covers abortion. Further, these three decisions were issued with the backdrop of Roe v. Wade providing constitutional protection for abortion. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs overturning Roe calls into question continued reliance on these opinions. Under the Constitution, there is no federal governmental interest in abortion and Title VII (and the PWFA) do not change that.

Abortion is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition of either. Indeed, abortion is not even a medical condition. Abortion is the act of forcibly ending a pregnancy and preventing childbirth by killing a child in the womb. It is anti-pregnancy and anti-childbirth. Since abortion is not a pregnancy or childbirth-related medical condition, it cannot be subject to PDA harassment protections. At minimum, EEOC should make clear in its final guidance that harassment protections for abortion are merely the Commission’s position, and not settled under law.

Other “reproductive decisions.” In EEOC’s proposed PWFA regulations, the Commission provides a “non-exhaustive” list of conditions it believes is covered by the phrase “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.” This list includes “current pregnancy, past pregnancy, potential pregnancy, lactation (including breastfeeding and pumping), use of birth control, menstruation, infertility and fertility treatments, endometriosis, miscarriage, stillbirth, or having or choosing not to have an abortion, among other conditions.” Is it the EEOC’s position that all the conditions identified in the PWFA regulations are “reproductive decisions” that would be grounds for a harassment claim? If the answer is yes and because the list of conditions identified in the PWFA regulations is “non-exhaustive,” I ask the agency to clarify in its final guidance whether the following “reproductive decisions” would likewise be grounds for a harassment claim: abortion unlawful under state law, fertility treatments for men or gay couples, male employees “chestfeeding” infants, surrogacy, adoption, uterus transplants, and hormones for gender transitions.

As EPPC’s PWFA comment explained:

even though the PWFA is pro-pregnancy and pro-childbirth, the EEOC proposes requiring accommodations when an employee’s goal is to avoid or electively end a pregnancy. The use of birth control and abortion are fundamentally anti-pregnancy and anti-childbirth. Further, EEOC’s list of covered conditions expands well beyond actual medical conditions as required by the Act to cover medical interventions such as the use of birth control, fertility treatments, and abortion.  

16 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 10 n.27.
18 Id. at 54,774.
19 For example, California lawmakers redefined “infertility” to include same-sex couples who would like to have children but obviously cannot without involving a third party. See Cal. S.B. 729 (2023).
EEOC should not repeat the same error here. Harassment protections should be limited to the grounds protected by statute—pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical *conditions*.

**II. EEOC harassment guidance should clarify its application to the PWFA.**

While the guidance references pregnancy, it does not mention the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, the most recent law EEOC is tasked with enforcing. In EEOC’s recently proposed regulations implementing the PWFA, the Commission proposed adding “harass” to the statutory list of prohibited activities in the Act’s coercion provision. In EPPC scholars’ comment opposing the expansive proposed PWFA regulations, we wrote:

The PWFA prohibits retaliation and also makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere” with “the exercise or enjoyment of[] any right granted or protected by [the PWFA].” The EEOC proposes adding “harass” to this list. We believe it is inappropriate for EEOC to add to the list of prohibited activities that Congress provided in the text of the statute. While we agree that harassment could be a form of coercion, harassment can also be broader than coercion, and thus, harassment should only be prohibited to the extent that it is coercive, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with a worker’s PWFA rights.

In that comment, we asked the EEOC to clarify whether its proposed harassment guidance will apply to the PWFA. I reiterate that request here. If the answer is yes, I ask that EEOC reopen its proposed harassment guidance for public comment so that the public can provide input on the guidance’s application to the PWFA.

**III. EEOC harassment guidance should accurately reflect the limits of Bostock and not extend to “misgendering” or sex-specific spaces.**

The EEOC explains the updated guidance “reflects notable changes in law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in *Bostock v. Clayton County*.” Yet the Commission’s proposed guidance goes far beyond *Bostock*’s holding.

Citing to *Bostock*, the guidance states, “sex-based harassment includes harassment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, *including how that identity is expressed.*” The guidance provides examples of what such harassment could include:

- epithets regarding sexual orientation or gender identity; physical assault; harassment because an individual does not present in a manner that would stereotypically be associated with that person’s gender; intentional and repeated use of a name or pronoun inconsistent with the individual’s gender identity (misgendering); or the denial of access to a bathroom or other sex-segregated facility consistent with the individual’s gender identity.

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22 EPPC PWFA Comment, *supra* note 20, at 30 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).


24 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 10-11 (emphasis added).

25 *Id.* at 11-12.
Example 4 provides a hypothetical scenario elaborating on the Commission’s position on harassment based on gender identity.

Jennifer, a cashier at a fast food restaurant who identifies as female, alleges that supervisors, coworkers, and customers regularly and intentionally misgender her. One of her supervisors, Allison, frequently uses Jennifer’s prior male name, male pronouns, and “dude” when referring to Jennifer, despite Jennifer’s request for Allison to use her correct name and pronouns; other managers also intentionally refer to Jennifer as “he.” Coworkers have asked Jennifer questions about her sexual orientation and anatomy and asserted that she was not female. Customers also have intentionally misgendered Jennifer and made threatening statements to her, but her supervisors did not address the harassment and instead reassigned her to duties outside of the view of customers. Based on these facts, Jennifer has alleged harassment based on her gender identity.  

As explained below, Bostock was a limited holding and does not support this proposed broad application of gender identity harassment.

A. Bostock addressed “transgender status” and did not adopt “gender identity” as a protected class.

In Bostock, the Supreme Court held that under Title VII “an employer who fires someone simply for being homosexual or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that individual ‘because of such individual’s sex.’”  

Notably, the majority in Bostock used the term “transgender” or “transgender status,” not “gender identity,” throughout its opinion. Significantly, Bostock did not adopt “gender identity” as a protected class. As such, EEOC cannot rely on Bostock to support application of sex discrimination to “gender identity.” Indeed, the harassment guidance cites to circuit court decisions describing Bostock’s holding in terms of “gender identity” and not the language in Bostock itself.

To the extent that the Commission believes that there is no distinction between “gender identity” and “transgender status,” there is no need to use a different term than the Supreme Court used. The Commission should be faithful to the Supreme Court’s articulation in Bostock. If, however, there is a distinction between the two terms, then it is inappropriate for the Commission to go beyond the Supreme Court’s articulation. Indeed, it appears that by using the arguably broader term “gender identity” the Commission is seeking to extend protections beyond “status” to related behavior or “how that identity is expressed.” But, as explained more below, that is more than Bostock held.

B. Bostock was limited to status; the Court explicitly did address related conduct.

The EEOC explains, “Bostock itself concerned allegations of discriminatory discharge, but the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the decision logically extends to claims of harassment. Indeed, courts have readily found post-Bostock that claims of harassment based on one’s sexual orientation or gender identity are cognizable under Title VII.” However, the Supreme Court in Bostock specifically cabined its

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26 Id. at 12.
27 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
28 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 10 n.28.
29 Id. at 11 n.29.
decision to status, or “being transgender.” As a federal district court explained, Bostock’s holding was cabined to “homosexuality and transgender status” and does not extend to “correlated conduct—specifically, the sex-specific: (1) dress; (2) bathroom; (3) pronoun; and (4) healthcare practices.” The EEOC ignores the text of Bostock; it “misread[s] Bostock by melding ‘status’ and ‘conduct’ into one catchall protected class covering all conduct correlated to ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity. Justice Gorsuch expressly did not do that.”

The majority in Bostock explained it was not addressing a “broader scope” of conduct and other Title VII issues, such as sex-specific bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes. While the Court acknowledged concerns by some that its decision could make sex-specific bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes “unsustainable” and “sweep beyond Title VII to other federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination,” the Court did not address those concerns. The Court explained that such questions were for “future cases” and the Court would not prejudge any such questions because “none of th[o]se other laws [we]re before [them].”

While the EEOC relies on other Title VII cases and federal sector EEOC decisions, it “cannot rely on the words and reasoning of Bostock itself to explain why the Court prejudged what the Court expressly refused to prejudge.” The EEOC should heed the Supreme Court’s direction and likewise not prejudge those questions the Court left unanswered, especially as it relates to pronouns and sex-specific spaces. The Supreme Court was clear that Bostock did not decide any issue beyond hiring and firing based on “homosexuality and transgender status” under Title VII. It is inappropriate for EEOC guidance to ignore Bostock’s limitations and claim Bostock supports its extension of harassment claims to how a person’s gender identity is expressed.

C. Bostock assumed sex is biological and binary.

Bostock premised its decision on the assumption that “sex” refers only to the “biological distinctions between male and female.” A biological view of sex is incompatible with a gender spectrum or fluidity, which is promoted through use of the phrases “gender identity” and “how that identity is expressed.” To be consistent with Bostock, which the guidance claims to follow, EEOC must also assume “sex” refers to “biological distinctions between male and female.”

D. Using pronouns that correspond with a person’s sex should not constitute harassment.

Example 4 calls a person’s name and pronouns that correspond to the person’s gender identity “correct,” implying that use of pronouns that correspond to a person’s biological sex are “incorrect.” Citing several unreported district court cases, the EEOC notes, “Courts—even prior to the Supreme

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31 Id. at *4.

32 Id. at *6 (citations omitted).

33 140 S. Ct. at 1739.

34 Id. at 1753.

35 Id.

36 Id.


38 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
Court’s *Bostock* decision—have viewed evidence of intentional misgendering as supportive of a hostile work environment claim.”

The guidance, however, fails to mention the First Amendment’s protections for free speech or religious exercise. It thus fails to provide any guidance as to how these fundamental rights might constrain its pronoun mandate. On October 10, 2023, a group of Senators sent a letter to the State Department raising compelled speech and religious liberty concerns with the state department’s gender identity pronoun policy, citing the First Amendment, Title VII, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). A 2021 Sixth Circuit decision in *Meriwether v. Hartop* allowed a professor’s First Amendment challenge to a university pronoun policy to proceed on free-speech and free-exercise grounds. The case ultimately settled, with the university agreeing to pay $400,000 in damages and attorney’s fees. At the very least, EEOC should acknowledge the free speech and free exercise concerns raised by the Senators and the Sixth Circuit and take a position on whether the First Amendment, Title VII, and RFRA provide protections for employees or employers who object to using pronouns that do not correspond to a person’s biological sex?

The EEOC’s proposed gender identity pronoun mandate leaves many open questions. If the final guidance includes the proposed pronoun mandate, which it shouldn’t, the EEOC should clarify the following questions about its application. Under the guidance, will employers be required to police pronoun usage by employees and customers? Does the guidance apply to any pronouns a person claims reflect the person’s gender identity? Does it apply to “neopronouns”? Does it apply to pronouns that would otherwise be inappropriate, impolite, or offensive words? Is there any limit on what pronouns employers and employees would be required to use if a person claims those pronouns reflect the person’s gender identity?

For example, would it be considered harassment to not use the following pronouns consistent with an individual’s gender identity:

- He/him to refer to a biological female;
- She/her to refer to a biological male;
- They/them to refer to a singular individual;
- It/its to refer to a human being;
- Ze/zir (or hir), xe/xyr, fae/faer, ae/aer;
- Leaf/leafself;

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39 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 11 n.33.
46 See *id.*
• Love/loves;
• Pumpkin/spice;
• Pup/pupself;
• Fish/fishself;
• Toy/toyself;
• Nor/mal;
• Beep/boop;
• Hee/haw;
• Rawr/rawrs;
• Clown/clownself; etc.

Does the pronoun mandate extent to:

• Titles and honorifics?
• The use emojis as pronouns?
• Individuals who use mixed or multiple sets of pronouns?
• Individuals who continually change their pronouns?
• Individuals that request that different types of people use different pronouns when referring to them?

Does the pronoun mandate apply to pronouns employees say corresponds with their gender identity, but appear to mock or troll others’ pronouns? If no, how can an employer determine a “proper” use of pronouns? If a person’s gender identity is subjective and self-defined, on what basis does the EEOC recommend that an employer determine whether a person’s self-proclaimed pronouns do not actually reflect that person’s self-proclaimed gender identity?

In short, EEOC’s gender identity pronoun mandate is impractical, unsustainable, and raises serious free speech and religious exercise concerns. EEOC should not include the proposed pronoun mandate in its final guidance.

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47 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7197266276870409515.
48 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7281473755426131242.
49 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7229899571638439210.
50 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XXyp58lKo.
51 See id.
52 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7208392801657097518.
53 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7235467934502522155.
54 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7209527043975957803.
55 See https://www.tiktok.com/@lesbiansnowwhite/video/7238805383563824427.
56 See https://www.tiktok.com/@tom_f420/video/7201353809078045957.
E. Maintaining sex-specific bathrooms and other facilities should not constitute harassment.

To support its position that employers must permit employees to access bathrooms that correspond to their gender identity, the EEOC cites to Title IX bathroom cases. But Title IX cases, while often persuasive in the Title VII context, do not create a legal basis for EEOC’s bathroom mandate under Title VII. As EEOC acknowledges in footnotes, courts disagree as to whether Title IX requires access to bathrooms based on gender identity in schools, much less whether a Title IX bathroom mandate extends to Title VII and the workplace.

Further, like with the pronoun mandate, EEOC’s position that access to bathrooms, locker rooms, and other intimate sex-specific facilities should be based on gender identity is unsustainable. Under the guidance, it would be harassment to block a biological male who identifies as a woman from accessing a women’s locker room while women are changing or showering. But would it likewise be harassment to block a biological male who identifies as a man from accessing a women’s locker room while women are changing or showering? If not, why not? On what basis can an employer make distinctions based on gender identity but not biological sex?

Allowing access to private spaces based on gender identity will create a host of practical problems in the workplace. Would an employer be subject to a harassment claim if it knowingly allowed a male into private spaces reserved for females? If an employer were subject to such a claim, would it have a defense if the employer believed that the male identified as a woman? If anyone can use sex-specific facilities based on self-declared identity, how can employers ensure that their employees, especially female employees, are free from a hostile work environment? There will be no limiting principle as gender identity is subjective and self-declared. A person’s identity could also change day-to-day, opening the door (literally) for individuals to take advantage of the policy to invade the private spaces of females. Women, especially survivors of sexual assault, deserve to use the bathroom, change, or shower without the presence of biological men (however they identify). Such intimate facilities should remain sex-specific (regardless of gender identity) to promote privacy and safety. Title VII does not mandate otherwise.

IV. EEOC harassment guidance should explicitly acknowledge protections for religious organizations.

The guidance not only overstates what counts as “harassment” under federal law and cases interpreting the same; it neglects entirely to mention that the First Amendment and Congress protect the right of religious employers to make employment decisions according to their religious beliefs. At a minimum, EEOC’s final guidance should acknowledge the legal protections for religion identified by the court in Bostock: the First Amendment ministerial exception, Title VII’s religious organization

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61 WebMD, *What is Fluid?*, [https://www.webmd.com/sex/what-is-fluid](https://www.webmd.com/sex/what-is-fluid) (“Someone who is fluid—also called gender fluid—is a person whose gender identity (the gender they identify with most) is not fixed. It can change over time or from day-to-day…. A person who is gender fluid may identify as male one day, female the next, both male and female, or neither.”).
exemption, and RFR. The final guidance should explicitly affirm that additional consideration could apply to harassment claims for employees at religious organizations.

A. First Amendment Ministerial Exception

The First Amendment guarantees the “independence of religious institutions in matters of faith and doctrine.” That constitutional protection includes employment decisions falling under what has been dubbed the “ministerial exception.” This exception requires courts to “stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with” religious organizations, such as those that “play certain key roles” and who perform “vital religious duties” at the core of the mission of the religious institution. The Supreme Court, lower courts, and EEOC religion guidance have all recognized that the ministerial exception covers a much broader range of employment positions than the term “minister” might otherwise suggest. As the EEOC recognizes in its religion guidance, the ministerial exception “applies regardless of whether the challenged employment decision was for ‘religious’ reasons.” In the final guidance, the EEOC should recognize that the ministerial exception can apply to harassment claims by key employees at religious organizations. These claims would most likely involve situations where the employee disagrees with the employer’s religious beliefs about abortion, contraception, sexual orientation, and gender identity.

Recognition in the final harassment guidance of the potential application of the ministerial exception is particularly important because a vast majority of courts of appeals have held that the First Amendment protects religious groups from the burdens of litigation, not merely the imposition of liability, regarding their ministerial employment decisions. EEOC religion guidance directs its staff to “resolve[]” the ministerial exception “at the earliest possible stage before reaching [an] underlying discrimination claim.” The guidance explains the exception is “not just a legal defense . . . , but a constitutionally-based guarantee that obligates the government and the courts to refrain from interfering or entangling themselves with religion.” As explained more fully in an amicus brief filed on behalf of former EEOC General Counsel Sharon Fast Gustafson and myself, “If not required to resolve the ministerial exception at the outset, EEOC staff will have free rein to launch long and onerous campaigns.”

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64 Id. at 2060, 2066.
66 See Natal v. Christian & Missionary All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1577-78 (1st Cir. 1989); Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church, 903 F.3d 113, 118 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018); Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2015); Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968, 980–982 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Cath. U. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466-467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
68 Id. Concerningly, and in contrast to the religion guidance, EEOC recently filed an amicus brief in Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute urging the Seventh Circuit to dismiss Moody’s appeal of the denial of its religious defenses to a Title VII sex discrimination claim, arguing that Moody’s religious defenses should not get appellate review until after all the other underlying claims are litigated in the district court. See Sharon Fast Gustafson & Rachel N. Morrison, EEOC’s ‘Gender Discrimination’ Campaign and Crusade against Religious Employers, Nat’l Rev. (Sept. 27, 2023, 1:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/eeocs-gender-discrimination-campaign-and-crusade-against-religious-employers/ (discussing concerns of EEOC’s Garrick amicus brief). “As a taxpayer-funded government agency, the EEOC should be neutral, objective, and fair. It should favor, or at least it should not deliberately frustrate, litigation economy.” Id.
investigations into religious organizations, with all of their attendant costs.” The harassment guidance, which EEOC intends as a resource for EEOC staff and practitioners, should provide the same direction or, at a minimum, direct to the relevant discussion in the religion guidance. To do otherwise would risk unconstitutional entanglement by EEOC staff with a religious organization’s religious exercise.

B. Title VII Religious Organization Exemption

The proposed guidance makes no mention of the Title VII religious organization exemptions. The exemption, found in section 702, states, in the relevant part, “This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”

This subchapter covers discrimination (including harassment) claims based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Thus, even though religious organizations are generally subject to Title VII’s nondiscrimination requirements on the basis of race, color, sex, and national origin, by the text of Title VII, those prohibitions (part of “this subchapter”) do not apply with respect to “the employment of individuals of a particular religion.”

EEOC’s religion guidance rightly recognizes that Title VII’s religious exemptions “allow a qualifying religious organization to assert as a defense to a Title VII claim of discrimination or retaliation that it made the challenged employment decision on the basis of religion.” Employment, as the EEOC recognizes, covers the full range of the employer-employee relationship, which includes policies about abortion, pronouns, and sex-specific spaces. “Religion” as defined in Title VII “includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” As such, Title VII allows qualifying religious organizations to make employment decisions based on religion, which includes beliefs, observances, and practices. This protection extends regardless of how the underlying harassment claim is characterized. For example, even though a certain employment decision could be characterized as harassment based on sex, if the underlying employment decision was based on the religious organization’s religious beliefs, observances, or practices, Title VII’s religious organization exemption would apply.

As Congress recognized when it passed Title VII, a religious organization’s ability to make employment decisions based on its sincere religious tenets is at the heart of what it means to be a religious organization. For example, it does little good for a Catholic organization to be able to prefer a “particular religion” if that means they must accept all baptized Catholics regardless of whether they have, since their baptism, embraced beliefs, attitudes, or practices that are antithetical to the Catholic faith. Worse still, no government bureaucrat can be lawfully empowered to determine what it truly means to be Catholic or any other “particular” religion without violating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.

The EEOC, in its interpretation and application of its harassment guidance, should explicitly recognize Title VII prohibits the federal government from interfering with a religious organization’s use of religious criteria in its employment decisions, including decisions that could be recharacterized as harassment on a protected basis. Such recognition would rightly comport with Title VII’s limitations.

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C. RFRA

Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1990 Employment Division v. Smith case. RFRA was passed with overwhelming bipartisan support and signed into law by President Bill Clinton, indicating the strong consensus that the Supreme Court had improperly interpreted the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. Under RFRA, the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless “it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”73 As the Supreme Court recognized in Bostock, RFRA is a “super statute” that “might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases.”74 In finalizing its harassment guidance, the EEOC should consider and explicitly acknowledge the constraints of RFRA, which directs the Commission, as an arm of the federal government, to not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise.

V. EEOC harassment guidance should not treat religious expression as second class.

Regarding religious expression, the guidance states: “If a religious employee attempts to persuade another employee of the correctness of his beliefs, the conduct is not necessarily objectively hostile. If, however, the employee objects to the discussion but the other employee nonetheless continues, a reasonable person in the complainant’s position may find it to be hostile.”75 The guidance further states that attempts to convince coworkers about the correctness of a religious belief is “not necessarily objectively hostile.”76 These statements beg the question: is there ever an instance where an employee sharing his or her faith (without known objection) would be objectively hostile? Could an employee’s conversation about religion with another consenting coworker constitute a hostile work environment for a third coworker who overhears the conversation? I ask the EEOC clarify these important points in its final guidance.

The EEOC also provides a note on “special consideration when balancing anti-harassment and accommodation obligations with respect to religious expression.”77 The guidance acknowledges while “Title VII requires that employers accommodate employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, and observances in the absence of undue hardship,” employers “also have a duty to protect workers against religiously motivated harassment.”78 Specifically, “[e]mployers are not required to accommodate religious expression that creates, or reasonably threatens to create, a hostile work environment. As with other forms of harassment, an employer should take corrective action before the conduct becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.”79 Yet the guidance once again fails to acknowledge additional laws protecting religious expression and exercise for employees, such as the First Amendment and RFRA. I ask the EEOC reference those additional considerations, which are particularly relevant for federal government employers, in its final guidance.

73 Id. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).
75 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 46-47.
76 Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 93.
78 Id.
79 Id.
VI. **EEOC harassment guidance should avoid race and color discrimination.**

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin. Concerningly, language in EEOC’s harassment guidance treats different races and colors differently. The guidance states, “Race-based harassment includes harassment based on a complainant’s race, e.g., harassment because the complainant is Black, Asian American, white, or multiracial.” Without explanation, the EEOC repeatedly capitalizes “Black” while lowercasing “white” when referring to a person’s race or color. In contrast, just this year in *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College* when discussing students of different races/colors, the Supreme Court lowercased both black and white. Capitalizing one race or color while choosing not to capitalize another race or color is discriminatory. Black and white should either be both capitalized or both lowercase.

In 2020, several prominent media organizations announced they would “capitalize Black in a racial, ethnic or cultural sense, conveying an essential and shared sense of history, identity and community among people who identify as Black, including those in the African diaspora and within Africa.” At the same time, many media organizations explicitly refused to likewise capitalize white (and sometimes brown). Perhaps this sentiment was the impetus for the Commission’s capitalization decisions. It should, however, go without saying that it is inappropriate, especially for a government agency, to assume that all people who identify as black share a sense of history, identity, and community, just as not all people who identify as white (or brown) share a sense of history, identity, and community.

The unequal capitalization based on race/color is discriminatory and should not be perpetuated by the federal agency tasked with preventing and remedying unlawful employment discrimination based on race and color. I urge the EEOC to treat all races and colors equally in its capitalization decisions, whether that is choosing to capitalize or lowercase both black and white. If, however, the Commission continues to capitalize black but lowercase white throughout its guidance, I ask the EEOC explain on what basis such unequal treatment is justified under the law.

VII. **EEOC harassment guidance should clarify application to private social media posts.**

The guidance states harassment could occur in non-work-related contexts but impact the workplace, such as social media posts. The EEOC explains, “Given the proliferation of digital technology, it is increasingly likely that the non-consensual distribution of real or computer-generated intimate images using social media can contribute to a hostile work environment, if it impacts the workplace.” According to the guidance, social media posts on a personal social media page could contribute to a hostile work environment if an “employee learns about the post directly or other coworkers see the comment and discuss it at work.”

These statements raise many unanswered questions and free speech concerns. To what extent will an employer have to police its employees’ use of social media? Can a hostile work environment be created by “likes” or “reposts”? Does mere offense or disagreement with a coworkers’ social media posts constitute an impact on the workplace? Could a person’s posts about abortion, marriage, gender, or sexuality contribute to a hostile work environment? Does this extend to support or opposition to political

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80 Id. at 5-6.
83 EEOC Proposed Harassment Guidance at 55.
84 Id. at 54-55.
candidates or policies? Could a person’s private social media post quoting a Bible verse contribute to a hostile work environment? The guidance appears to impose an unconstitutional chilling of free speech, especially on matters of great public importance. I ask the EEOC to provide more clarity and guidance in its final guidance around this emerging area of law and potential First Amendment free speech ramifications.

**Conclusion**

In finalizing its harassment guidance, I urge the Commission to not overstate or misstate the law, drop its gender identity pronoun and bathroom mandates, and explicitly acknowledge legal protections for free speech and religious exercise in the workplace.

Sincerely,

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